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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor: Francis T. Crowe*
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
Recent release of the official CAB accident report concerning a DC-6
crash at Bryce Canyon, Utah,1 is illustrative of the various liabilities attend-
ant to many modern airline crashes. A layman's cursory reading of the
accident report would reach the same conclusion as the jurist-the aircraft
manufacturer, Douglas Aircraft Company, was certainly partly at fault.
Since the owner-operator is the party considered prima facia liable and
because of the higher degree of care to which carriers are held, carrier
counsel is concerned, when possible, with shifting the liability to a third
party-7the manufacturer. Notwithstanding the dearth of litigation on the
subject, it appears that an aircraft manufacturer may occasionally be shown,
in a suit for damages, to have been negligent in either design or construction.
Therefore the purpose of this note is to suggest guides for the analysis of the
cases, to set forth conclusions as to the accepted law regarding manufacturer's
liability, and to point out ancillary problems.
ANALYSIS
Before discussing the cases an analysis should be made as to the legal
status of the parties and as to what their respective relationships are to
each other. Generally the parties will fall into one of the following six
categories: 1) passenger, 2) carrier personnel, 3) carrier, 4) manufacturer,
5) his supplier of component parts and materials, and, 6) third persons.
As against third persons and carrier personnel there looms always a prob-
able defense of contributory negligence. Although contributory negligence
may be a defense employed between some party relationships, it does not
follow that it may be invoked in others, i.e. a farmer's cow killed by a forced
landing.
A logical classification of the causes of most aircraft crashes is important
in order to relate manufacturer's liability to the whole legal problem pre-
sented by any airplane accident. All crashes find their genesis either in
(1) pilot and/or other personnel error or (2) mechanical failure or (3) a
combination in varying proportions of both. Ever advancing technical prog-
ress and scientific accident analysis have forced a retreat of the vis major
and "act of God" explanations for man's ignorance and frailties. We are
* Student Editor, Northwestern University Legal Publications Board.
'CAB Accident Investigation Report, United Air Lines Inc., Bryce Canyon,
Utah, October 24, 1947, SA-153-156, File No. 1-0097-47. Adopted: December 16,
1948, Released: December 21, 1948, in which 47 passengers and 5 crew members
were killed. The CAB report establishes conclusively that the cause of the acci-
dent was the improper location of one of the alternate tank vent outlets-it being
located diagonally forward of the cabin heater combustion air intake scoop so
that the overflow was carried by the slipstream into the scoop. The fire resulting
in a crash while attempting an emergency landing was caused by an overflow of
gasoline while transferring fuel to equalize the load; the spilled gasoline being
picked up by the cabin heating system and burning with sufficient violence to
ignite the emergency landing flares. However, see CAA press release No. 323,
Dec. 23, 1948, "CAA presents facts not included in CAB accident report" which
points out that the CAA flight manual and the operations manual for the DC-6
issued by the Douglas Aircraft Company prior to the accident both set forth
safe procedure for the feeding of fuel from all tanks to any engine. The transfer
of fuel in flight from one tank to another was not authorized by the manual.
Although transfer in flight was reported common practice among pilots, neither
CAA nor Douglas considered a mandatory prohibition necessary.
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primarily concerned here with mechanical failure, the cause of which breaks
down progressively into improper (1) design, (2) construction or (3)
maintenance. The latter is due usually to fault on the part of the air carrier's
operations department, and therefore not treated here. Hence our focus is
brought to bear upon negligence in either design or construction which may
be established as the cause of a'crash.
MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY
The development of manufacturer's liability has had a long and interest-
ing history.2 Today the cases dealing with this subject usually proceed from
the reasoning set forth by Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick.3 The
problem was worked out on a tort duty theory as follows:
"If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.
... If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing
will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully.... There must be knowledge
of a danger, not merely possible, but probable. . . . There must also be
knowledge that in the usual course of events the danger will be shared
by others than the buyer .... We are dealing now with the liability of the
manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the market to be
used without inspection by his customers."
As evidenced by the reservation made in the last sentence above, this theory
applies only to the ultimate customer purchasing new goods.
Two other theories have been employed to impose liability upon the
manufacturer or dealer in used or new machines, one of false representation
and the other of warranty. The former has been considered even strong
enough to overcome the plaintiff's own contributory negligence where a
representation as to a safety feature was concerned. 4 We are not concerned
with this theory here since it depends upon factors attendant at the sale of
the item rather than the manufacture. A recovery upon a theory of warranty
is, of course, also open when the facts of the transaction reveal that there
was an express warranty; however, it is usually restricted to those who are
in privity with the seller and only by a stretch of the imagination could it
be considered to "run with the product" in order to include a passenger.
The theory of implied warranty fell into disuse upon the general acceptance
of the reasoning in MacPherson v. Buick.5
2 Manufacturers received their early protection through the reasoning em-
ployed in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, 11 L.J. Ex. 415 (1842), which
stands for the proposition that neither the manufacturer nor supplier of a mail
coach were liable for the injuries sustained by its driver when the coach foun-
dered due to a latent defect in the construction of a wheel. The theory of deny-
ing recovery against the manufacturer by the driver or passengers was that of
lack of privity with the manufacturer. Later this theory was undermined by
Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882) where the builder of a scaffold for a painting
contractor was held liable for the death of plaintiff's intestate, a painter, when he
plunged to his death due to a failure of the structure. The decision flew in the
face of the old non-privity lines of reasoning and predicated liability on the
builder's knowledge of the use to which the scaffolding was to be put, and that he
could have reasonably forseen that injury would result from a negligently erected
structure. Final preparation for the MacPherson doctrine came in Thomas v.
Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) wherein a seller was held liable to third persons
for negligence in the preparation or sale of an article "inherently dangerous" to
human safety. It is interesting to speculate as to whether this theory might not
be directly applied to airplanes without reliance upon the MacPherson doctrine.
See also A.L.I. Restatement of Torts, section 395.
3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
r Supra, note 3.
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Entirely different theories of liability might apply as to the pilot-owner
of a light plane who has made no inspection of his craft before the crash,
and the case of a passenger on a large transport ship which was inspected
thoroughly by carrier maintenance personnel or possibly even manufac-
tured under their supervision. If the carrier has inspected the plane the
express exception to the MacPherson case might apply: "We are dealing now
with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product who puts it on
the market to be used without inspection by his customers." Interwoven
with this problem is that of the degree to which inspection should be made
both by the manufacturer and the carrier. Although one usually thinks in
terms of the alternative liability of either manufacturer or carrier in this
field, concurrent liability may well lie where both manufacturer and carrier
have been lax in their inspections. Such ideas will find their expression
articulated in terms of the relative degrees of care and particularity of in-
spection which the manufacturer and carrier must exercise under varying
circumstances. It is interesting to observe that although the carriers are
held to a high degree of care, the manufacturers of their equipment are held
to a degree of care measured by an "ordinary individual" test.
Perhaps the best aircraft case, squarely in point on the facts, is Maynard
v. Stinson Aircraft Corp.6 The plaintiff sued and recovered $27,500 in dam-
ages for injuries received when an airplane, manufactured by the defendant,
in which she was a passenger, caught fire and burned on the ground. She
claimed two grounds of negligence which concurrently caused the fire: (1)
that the exhaust stacks were too short and would emit hot gas fumes too
close to the fuselage (1" from the metal skin of the fuselage), and, (2) that
the carburetor drain was too close to the exhaust stacks so that spilling
gasoline would cling to the skin in the boundary air layer and be ignited
by the exhaust.
In the charge to the jury the judge said that negligence was to be given
the "ordinary individual" test, qualified to the extent that this ordinary
individual should be one skilled in the art of designing aircraft possessed
with knowledge commensurate with the advanced state of science in the art
at the time of the design, 1934. The plaintiff was given the burden of show-
ing that (1) gasoline did come out of the carburetor drain and adhere to the
skin, and, (2) that gases at the ignition temperature of gasoline did come
out of the exhaust stacks and cause the fire. Furthermore, the plaintiff was
required to show that this was known, or should have been known to an
ordinary designer in 1934. Testimony as to the general practice in the
industry at the time was held not to be exculpatory. Recovery was had on a
basis of the negligent design of the exhaust stacks and fuel drain.
Specific reference to and adoption of the doctrine of the MacPherson case
in Breen v. Conn7 is unfortunately dictum since the facts involved are not
squarely applicable. The action involveda suit by the administratrix of a
deceased passenger against the executrix of the deceased operator's estate
for damages arising out of a crash. Eleven grounds of negligence were
alleged against the operator. Waco Aircraft was joined as a defendant be-
cause it had manufactured the plane and sold it later as second-hand to Conn,
allegedly mindful that it had been damaged prior to the sale and consequently
in a weakened condition. With respect to the liability of defendant Waco
the court cited MacPherson v. Buick," quoted the well known Cardozo
formula, supra, and then commented: "This innovation in the law of torts
6 1940 USAvR 71, 1 Avi. 698 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich. 1937).
7 1938 USAvR 160, 1 Avi. 772, 30 Ohio Law Abstract 483 (1938).
8 Supra, note 3.
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has been applied to the purchase of new automobiles. It likewise applies to
the purchase of new airplanes. Under no circumstance, however, could the
rule be applicable to the sale of a second-hand airplane under the allegations
in this petition." 9
The last sentence of this language shows that the italicized sentence is
merely dictum. However, the tenor of the opinion reveals an almost axiomatic
acceptance of the MacPherson doctrine into the aircraft field. Waco was held
free of negligence since the plane was purchased knowingly as second-hand
and since no express contract of warranty was pleaded. Thus we have the
Maynard case in which the facts applied and the MacPherson doctrine was
implicitly followed, and the Breen case in which the MacPherson doctrine
was explicitly adopted, however, as admitted dictum since the facts did not
apply.
RELATED CASES
Close kinship between the liability of manufacturers and those who
undertake extensive aircraft repairs and modifications, warrants a discussion
of the latter type of cases. Perhaps the best is American Airways et al. v.
Ford Motor Company'0 in which the defendant, Ford, solicited the plaintiff
with a view to installing new high speed equipment on its planes. Six were
processed, all of which were three motored planes presumably of the de-
fendant's manufacture, the ill-fated one amongst them. Facts adduced at
the trial showed that the crash was caused by a propellor hub failure due to
scratches on the inner machined surfaces of the hub." It was held that the
plaintiff had a right to rely on the defendant's performance, and that cor-
respondingly the defendant had a duty to check for these scratches which it
knew were fraught with dangerous potentialities.
Here again the theory is built upon a right-duty analysis very much like
the MacPherson case. No jury was employed. On appeal the case was af-
firmed as to the liability of defendant, Ford, with only a minor modification
as to the insurer's expenses incurred in the settlement of death claims. One
dissent was registered, but only as to the evidentiary matter as to whether
there was sufficient proof that the defendant knew or should have known of
the dangerous potentialities of the tool marks, and, whether the tool marks
were the actual cause of the hub failure and resultant crash.
McCoy v. Stinson Aircraft Corp.12 involved a modification installed by
one of Stinson's employees on a relatively new Stinson plane. 13 The court in
9 Emphasis supplied. See Flies v. Fox Brothers Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218
N.W. 855, 60 A.L.R. 357 for liability of seller of used automobiles.
10 1939 USAvR 149, 1 Avi. 809, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 998, aff'd, 284 N.Y. 807, 31
N.E. (2d) 925 (1935).
11 An item of importance on the work order was to "recondition propellors-
etch-balance--polish--paint-tips." "Etching" was a process of treating the hubs
with an acid solution to detect possible cracks. None were reported. The previous
year the defendant's engineering department in a memorandum to the repair
department reported a hub failure due to a crack propagated by sharp tool marks
and warned that deep scratches were a breeding ground for fatigue failure. Proof
adduced at trial revealed that this was the cause of the hub failure in the instant
case and that machine marks, easily visible with an ordinary magnifying glass,
were inside the hub. As a matter of showing further culpability of the defendant
and elimination of the manufacturer, letters from the Hamilton Propellor Com-
pany informing the defendant that the hubs were not adequately designed and
could be replaced free of charge were introduced.
12 1940 USAvR 84, 1 Avi. 868, Ontario Supp. (1939).
18 Plaintiff's deceased husband had flown the plane to one of defendant's
branches where a gusset was welded onto a wing fitting. This gusset and the
member to which it was welded were found broken upon examination of the wreck-
age. Three grounds of negligence were alleged in the plaintiff's case: (1) it was
negligent to weld a gusset to this plate in that the process of welding would
weaken the plate, (2) that the weld itself was improperly made, and, (3) that
the deceased pilot was not apprised of the dangerous condition.
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holding for the defendant, ruled that it must be shown that the condition
causing the crash could not have been introduced after delivery; or between
the performing of the welding operation and the crash. Also, which is but
a clearer statement of the prior proposition, that the plaintiff in her proof
had not eliminated extraneous causes which might account for the defective
condition which undoubtedly brought about the crash.
It is interesting to note that in the McCoy case and the Ford case the
substantive rules of liability appear to be accepted without argument. The
dispute centers over the degree of proof required as evidenced by the dissent
in the Ford case and the majority in the McCoy case. At first blush this may
appear to be an indication of a trend toward applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur; however, the cases show that only as between passenger and
carrier does this doctrine weigh heavily. Between carrier and manufacturer
there must be an actual showing of negligence.
Gladstone v. Grumman14 illustrates very effectively the degree to which
a manufacturer's liability may extend. Plaintiff's intestate was a Naval
Reservist flying in the gunner's seat of a plane of defendant's manufacture
when he was thrown into the sea-his seat still strapped to him. Negligence
was predicated upon faulty drawings prepared by the defendant from which
the U.S. Government made blueprints to be used as a guide for reassembly
after a major overhaul. A small contrivance, presumably a safety catch,
was negligently omitted from the drawing, and by virtue thereof it was
omitted in reassembly causing the seat to come loose while the plane was
engaged in acrobatics. The defendant's motion to dismiss was in the nature
of a demurrer, and was denied. On appeal the order denying the motion was
affirmed without opinion.
Only two cases with regard to the liability of a manufacturer of com-
ponent parts have been found: Sellers v. Champion Spark Plug Co.15 and
Lewis v. United Airlines.C In the former case (the only one which pro-
ceeded to a trial upon the merits) the plaintiff's theory was that the crash
of the plane which he was piloting was due to the fouling of improperly de-
signed spark plugs which brought about the engine failure causing the
crash. The plugs were manufactured by the defendant Champion, and sold
to the plaintiff by the defendant, Orgill Brothers' Hardware. The action was
in the nature of a bill in chancery, with the allegations and the evidence in
sharp conflict. The chancellor denied relief and dismissed the bills stating
that the plaintiff's allegations of fact were not sufficiently supported by the
evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi it was held that
the finding of the chancellor would not be disturbed unless it appeared from
the record to be manifestly in error. This was perhaps the first case on the
subject (1928), and was resolved on an issue of fact; demonstrating that
even at that early date the question of law was not deemed worthy of dis-
cussion by the court. Here the defense of contributory negligence was open
to both defendants, but would not have been had the action been against
Champion for the indemnification of Orgill Brothers.
A recapitulation of the cases discussed thus far leaves us with the con-
clusion that MacPherson v. Buick is accepted by the courts to apply to air-
craft manufacturers either by direct enunciation or by the results reached.
The main controversy is the degree of proof required in each individual
case to support adequately the legal theory. We turn now to the ancillary
14 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 252 (1938).
151929 USAvR 61, 1 Avi. 126; 150 Miss. 473, 116 So. 883 (1928).
161941 USAvR 245; 29 F. Supp. 112 (1939).
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problems raised in connection with the judicial process in fixing liability on
the manufacturer.
ANCILLARY PROBLEMS
The Lewis case 17 vividly demonstrates the procedural impediments to the
maintenance of the type of action required to resolve the liabilities when
several potential defendants exist. There the cause of action arose out of
a crash involving a United Airlines plane manufactured by United Aircraft.
The alleged cause of the engine failure resulting in the crash was a crack
in one of the engine cylinders. Four plaintiffs were involved, all citizens
of different states acting in representative capacities for the estates of their
decedents. Lewis was a citizen of Connecticut; United Airlines, an Illinois
corporation; and United Aircraft and Bethlehem Steel, both Delaware cor-
porations. The original action began in the Superior Court at Hartford,
Connecticut. Later the case was removed by United Aircraft (the manu-
facturer) to the Federal District Court on grounds of diversity of citizen-
ship. Thereafter United Aircraft filed a third party complaint against the
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the grounds being that if the cylinder was
defective, the defect had been caused by Bethlehem who had sold the forging
to Aircraft.
It was held that although the ancillary jurisdiction of the court invoked
by the third party complaint embraced the subject matter, as to the person
of defendant Bethlehem, the third party complaint was to be considered a
new action. Hence under section 51 of the Judicial Code' 8 the objection of
improper venue was open to Bethlehem and consequently the holding that
Bethlehem would have to be sued in the district of which it was an in-
habitant.
In a subsequent action' 9 between the same parties the issue was as to
whether a suit by representation for a declaratory judgment could be main-
tained. The court then held that the operator was not entitled to a declara-
tory judgment against the manufacturer for such sums as the operator has
had to pay or may be called upon to pay without the presence of the other
claimants, whom the court refers to as "stranger-plaintiffs". The court it-
self infers what the substantive law is and emphasizes the completely pro-
cedural nature of the defense by the commentary: "Indeed, by the pending
application (United) Aircraft does not question the propriety of a judg-
ment, if it shall eventually be warranted by the proofs, requiring (United)
Aircraft to indemnify Airlines for such sums as Airlines may become liable
to pay to the planitiffs in this suit."2 o
Frequently counsel is faced with the problem in cases of a technical na-
ture as to whether trial should be before a jury, the court alone, or a master.
It is the writer's opinion that a jury will not always be capable of rendering
a fair and considered judgment of the technical evidence involved in cases
such as have been discussed in this article. Unfortunately, elimination of
the right to trial by jury in ordinary civil actions in the United States can
come only by way of statute. A contemporary Canadian case2' seems to
17 Ibid.
Is 28 Mason's USC 112.
19 1941 USAvR 239, 1 Avi. 854; 34 F. Supp. 124 (1939).
20 Emphasis supplied.
21 Nysted v. Wings, Ltd., 1940 USAvR 151, 1 Avi. 1036; 51 M.R. 63 (1940).
The plaintiff was desirous of a trial by jury since a previous trial, Galer V. Wings,
Ltd., 1938 USAvR 177, 1 Avi. 778; 47 M.R. 281 (1938), by another passenger and
arising out of the same accident, resulted in an adverse determination by thejudge sitting without a jury. The technicalities of the case are briefly as follows:
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present the better view. There it was stated that courts of appeal have gen-
erally concurred in the proposition that in cases involving the weighing and
consideration of scientific evidence it is better for the judge to be the trier
of the facts. When one bears in mind the extent of damage to the plane and
the difficulty of determining the causes of aircraft crashes through exam-
ination of the wreckage, plus the possibility of fatigue failure, overstress-
ing, etc., it is not difficult to conclude that such matters are beyond the realm
of knowledge and experience of the average juror. Indeed, such matters may
be beyond most judges and might well be referred to a master equipped with
an aeronautical engineering or similar technical background.
It is also interesting to note that in Maynard v. Stinson22 the court would
not allow the introduction in evidence of a certificate of airworthiness. This
ruling accords with the hearsay evidence rule since the testimony of the
parties making out and granting the certificate was theoretically available.
However, the Secretary of Commerce instructed the examiners who issued
the certificate not to testify. Furthermore it has been held that air carriers
cannot rely upon the certificates and inspections accomplished by govern-
ment inspectors as a complete fulfillment of their duty of care.23
We are faced with the conclusion that manufacturers must assume li-
ability when warranted by the evidence-a dearth of litigation and rapid
settlement of claims buttresses this conclusion. Plaintiffs who must never-
theless bring suit are met with a nightmare of procedural and technical
difficulties.
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The accident occurred when the plane was taking off and a propellor blade sheared
off near the hub. The resultant vibration set up tore the engine loose from its
mounts, fire broke out, and the passengers were seriously injured. Expert testi-
mony revealed facts which proved that the failure of the propellor was due to
grain growth in the metal resulting from fatigue. High stresses were set up in
the propellor near the hub because the blade faired off too abruptly into the hub.
This was so designed in order to create a blast of air on the base of the cylinders
for proper cooling. The license to manufacture this design of propellor was can-
celled in 1933 in the United States, and its use prohibited absolutely on June 25,
1936, just two months subsequent to this accident. The judge found that the
failure was due to faulty design; however, he further found that the flaw was not
known to those skilled in the science and art at the time of the design. Conse-
quently the suit was dismissed as to the defendant air carrier.
22 Supr'a, note 6.
2 8 Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, 321 I1. App. 340, 63 N.E. (2d) 181
(1944).
* Student, Northwestern Law School, Competitor Legal Publication Board.
